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The intervenor in the present case insists that these well established principles do
not apply since the plaintiff upon receipt of payment of surety bond, executed the fol-
lowing agreement: " .... and does hereby assign, transfer, and set over .... and
does hereby subrogate the said American Surety Company of New York in and to all
the rights, claims, choses in action and remedies thereunder of the Washington Town-
ship Board of Finance against the State Bank of Westfield to the extent of Ten
Thousand Dollars ($io,ooo.oo)." In this respect the present case seems to have gone a
step farther than any of the above mentioned authorities. However, the Indiana court
seems correctly to have held (in spite of the intervenor's contention that such agree-
ment entitled them to "conventional subrogation"), that such part payment of the
total claim of the creditor against the bank did not entitle the intervener to a pro
tanto subrogation to the rights of the creditor. The court reasoned that the agreement
did not clearly show a contract for pro tanto subrogation, but that the assignment was
to operate only in accordance with the terms of the surety bond. To allow pro tanto
subrogation in the present case would certainly be highly prejudicial to the creditor
whose claim is not fully satisfied, and this would not be justifiable unless the right to
pro tanto subrogation is clearly expressed in the subsequent agreement, in view of the
contrary terms of the surety bond. The rule stated in Sheldon, Subrogation (1893),
§ 248 at page 373 is, "No claim by subrogation, whether conventional or by operation
of law, to the securities held or the remedies enjoyed by the creditor for the collection of
his demand, can be enforced, until the whole demand of the creditor has been satisfied.
Until then there can be no interference with the creditor's rights or securities which
might, even by possibility, prejudice or in any way embarrass him in the collection of
the residue of the demand." See also Board of Health v. Teutonia Bank and Trust Com-
pany, supra; Gannett v. Blodgett, 39 N.H. 150 (1859); Magee v. Leggett, 48 Miss. 139
(1873); Loeb v. Fleming, 15 Inl. App. 503 (1884); Fidelity and Deposit Company v. Wil-
kinson County, 109 Miss. 879, 69 So. 865 (1915); United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Company v. City of Pensacola, 68 Fla. 357, 67 So. 87 (1914), Ann. Cas. i 9 i6B, 1236; 37
Cyc., Subrogation, 408-409; 25 R.C.L. 1318, § 6, note 4.
The ruling against giving effect to the assignment in the present case is strengthened
by the very essence of the right of subrogation, the existence of which depends not
upon a contract but upon the equities of the case involved. 2 Williston, Contracts
(1920), 2302, § 1265; Arant, Suretyship (193), 358, § 79.
FkED 0. STEADRY
Torts-Libel-Due Care in Publication of Matter Secured from News Services-
[Florida].-Plaintiff sued the defendant newspaper for publication of libellous matter
received from the Associated Press and Universal News Service. There was no allega-
tion that defendant was negligent in selecting these agencies or in the publication.
Held, that the demurrer was properly sustained. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234
(Fla. 1933).
The test for libel per se is vilifying a man, bringing him into hatred, ridicule, or
contempt. Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 355 (1812); I Cooley, Torts (4th ed. 1932), 472,
§§ 140, 491, § 145. It is no defense that the defendant merely repeated what had been
told him by another whose name he gives, or copies into his newspaper a charge origi-
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nating elsewhere or publishes it as a communication or advertisement. Age Herald Pub.
Co. v. Waterman, i88 Ala. 272, 66 So. i6, i 9 x6E Ann. Cas. oc (i914); Spolek Den
Hlasatel v. Hoffiman, 204 Ill. 532, 68 N.E. 40o (i9o3); Nicholson v. Merrit, io9 Ky. 369
59 S.W. 25 (xgoo); Finnegan v. Eagle Printing Co., 173 Wis. 5, 179 N.W. 788 (I92o);
18 Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, Libel and Slander (2d ed. Garland & McGehee, igox),
1073; Law of Libel as Applied to Newspapers, 45 Chicago Leg. N. ig. The principal
case agrees thus far and also restates the historical view of malice, that while it is the
essence of libel, the law will imply malice of the character necessary to support a judg-
ment. Ray v. Shemwell, 186 Ky. 442, 217 S.W. 351 (1919); Stanley v. Prince, 118 Me.
360, io8 Aft. 328 (xgig); Lewis v. Daily News, 8x Md. 466, 32 Atl. 246, 29 L.R.A. So
(18o5); Zanley v. Hyde, 208 Mich. 96, 175 N.W. 261 (ixg9); Baker v. Winslow, 184
N.C. i, 113 S.E. 570 (1922). But implied malice taken over from the ecclesiastical
courts is merely a useless fiction retained from the form of the declaration and the
failure of the judges to admit that the law has been changed by decision. Coleman v.
Mac Lennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (19o8); Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159
Mass. 293, 34 N.E. 462, 20 L.R.A. 856 (1893); Jones v. Hidton, L.R. (r91o) A.C. 20;
Bower, Code of Law of Actionable Defamation (i9o8), appendix 2, 27,; N. St. John
Green, 6 Am. Law. R. 6og-6io; Odgers, Libel and Slander (6th ed. 1929), 4-5, 281-
282; Jeremiah Smith, Jones v. Hulton, 6o Univ. Pa. L. Rev. 365, 461, 463, note io for
citations; i Street, Foundations of Legal Liability (xgo6), 317. The principal case turns
on the misstated point that, following the ancient rule that one who heard a slander
was not liable for repeating it in the same words, naming his authority, the newspaper
is not liable for publication of news of reputable agencies. The old law was that the
publication coupled with the yielding up of the original publisher's name in such a way
as to give the plaintiff a complete cause of action against him was a good plea, but the
mere statement of the source was insufficient. Davi's v. Lewis, 7 Term Rep. 17 (x796);
Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East. 426 (1802); repudiated in McPherson v. Daniels, io B. & C.
263 (1829); Bower, Code of Law of Actionable Defamation (i9o8), 302. The principal
case takes a stand even beyond the English publishers' cases allowing the defendant to
escape liability by showing (x) innocence of knowledge of libel, (2) absence of any-
thing in the work or circumstances which should have led him to the belief that it con-
tained a libel, and (3) lack of negligence on his part. Emmens v. Pottle, x6 Q.B.D. 354,
2 T.L.R. I5 (i885); Vizetelly v. fudie Select Library, (i900) 2 Q.B.D. 170; Bottomley
v. Woolworth Co. L'td., 48 T.L.R. 521 (1932), since it casts the entire burden on the
plaintiff; contra, Sweet v. Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450, 102 N.E. 660, 47 L.R.A. (N.S.)
240, i9 i 4D Ann. Cas. 532 (1913); Corrigan v. Bobbs M1ferrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E.
260, io A.L.R. 662 (1920). The theory of the court seems to be a conglobation of
Holmes' objective theory of culpability (Hanson v. Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass.
293, 34 N.E. 462, 2o L.R.A. 856 (1893) and Note, 38 Harv. L. Rev. 1r00), the the-
ory of per quod libel to be applied only where the newspaper receives news service from
a reputable service. The importance to the state and to society of prompt news of daily
happenings and the slight chance of injury to a private character seems to justify the
decision.
GEPLnIN- W. LuTEs
Treaties-Extradition-Receiving Money Knowing It To Have Been Fraudulently
Obtained-[Federal].-The appeal is from an order of the Federal District Court dis-
